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Fascism, uncensored
Legalism and neo-fascist pilgrimage in Predappio, Italy
Paolo Heywood
1 On  28  October  2018,  many  Italian  news
networks were dominated,  as  they often
are  on  this  date,  by  coverage  of  a  tiny
village  in  Emilia-Romagna  named
Predappio.  Predappio  has  around  six
thousand  inhabitants,  though  most  of
these live in the surrounding countryside.
It  has  one  main  street,  just  under  a
kilometre long, and it is possible to walk
from one end to the other in a matter of
minutes. The coverage that day focused on a group of people who were doing more or
less exactly what they do every year on that date. They tend largely to wear one colour
—black—and they come to pay their respects to Predappio’s most famous son, Benito
Mussolini, who has been buried in the village cemetery since 1957. 28 October is the
anniversary of the “March on Rome” in which he took power in 1922, and is the largest
of three key anniversaries—the others being those of his birth and death—on which
such groups come to Predappio in large numbers for a demonstration.
2 In  2018  the  media  coverage  was  largely  concerned  with  one  particular  woman,  a
prospective mayoral candidate for the town of Budrio and an activist for Forza Nuova, a
far-right political party that received less than 1% in the recent Italian general election.
I watched her being photographed by journalists in Predappio, smiling in a black t-shirt
on which was emblazoned the word “Auschwitzland”. It was printed in Walt Disney-
style type, with an image of the square behind which Mussolini’s birth house is situated
in place of the Disney castle.
3 This shirt was the subject of immediate condemnation in the media from a range of
public  figures,  including  even  some  on  the  far-right.1 Meanwhile,  I  remained  in
Predappio for the evening of the 28th, on which a very different anniversary was being
celebrated. For only the third consecutive year, Italy’s National Association of Partisans
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(ANPI) had come to the village to mark the anniversary of its liberation in 1944, which
also, by coincidence, falls on 28 October. The event, held at the village cinema on a
street  blocked  off  by  riot  police,  was  introduced  by  three  speakers,  including  the
provincial president and the national vice-president of ANPI. Both of these men gave
impassioned speeches about the need to be vigilant against a resurgence of the far-
right, and were particularly inflamed by the woman in the “Auschwitzland” shirt. Both
men made clear their firm intention to demand of the authorities that the woman and
her comrades be prosecuted for the crime of “apologia del fascismo”, a demand reiterated
the next day by an Italian senator, this time directly to Italy’s Interior Minister, Matteo
Salvini.
4 As the week wore on, the Auschwitz museum submitted a complaint against the woman
to its local court in Poland, and the Disney Company declared themselves appalled at
the  use  of  their  imagery.  Yet  at  the  time  of  writing  there  appears  no  immediate
prospect of the woman or her comrades standing trial in Italy.
5 In Italy, such a prosecution, if it occurred, would fall under a law known as the Legge
Scelba,  passed  in  1952  and  named  after  then  Interior  Minister  Mario  Scelba,  and
modelled on the 12th Disposition of the post-war Italian constitution of 1947. Together,
both these measures forbid the reorganization of “the dissolved Italian Fascist Party”,
the PNF, together with “apologias” for it, or public demonstrations in favour of it. The
Scelba Law was further supplemented by a  1993 law known as  the Legge Mancino,
which  again  prohibits  the  public  exaltation  of  fascism,  as  well  as  hate  speech  and
discrimination  against  racial,  religious,  or  ethnic  minorities.  In  2018,  a  third  law,
named  after  deputy  Emmanuele  Fiano,  and  designed  to  criminalize  fascist
“propaganda”,  was also proposed,  but has been stalled in the senate since the that
year’s elections.
6 There is,  in  other words,  no shortage of  possible  legal  instruments with which the
Italian state might choose to pursue people like the woman in the “Auschwitzland”
shirt. Yet the likelihood is that they will choose not to do so, as they have been largely
so choosing ever since Mussolini’s body was first brought back for burial in Predappio
in 1957, and the large-scale pilgrimages began. Why is this?
7 The explanation, I argue, rests in the object of censorship: in Italy, this is usually not
taken to be a set of ideas, beliefs, or symbols, but a very particular thing, namely “the
dissolved  Italian  Fascist  Party”.  The  legislation  described  above  has  largely  been
interpreted to prohibit not a fascist party, in other words, but the Fascist Party, the
historical object2. In other words, to fall within its remit one must do more than possess
a set of beliefs or ideas about “fascism”; one must conjure up “Fascism”, the historical
phenomenon.
8 This  interpretation—and the  resulting  absence  of  censorship  of  people  such as  the
woman in the “Auschwitzland” shirt—is, I suggest, more than simple judicial restraint,
though of course it is no doubt that as well.  It is an intervention in a longstanding
problem  in  Italy  surrounding  the  relationship  between  fascism  and  history:  the
problem is whether or not the term “fascism” should be reserved to refer only to the
regime or movement that existed in Italy between 1922 and 1943 (or 1945, if the Italian
Social  Republic  is  included).  That  may  appear  a  surprising  position  to  adopt—
particularly in light of contemporary concerns regarding a global resurgence of fascism
—but it is nonetheless a far from uncommon argument to hear in Predappio and in Italy
more broadly, as I describe below.
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9 The practice of censoring certain articulations of far-right politics in Italy—or, more
appropriately,  the  logic  behind  the  pointed  absence  of  such  censorship—puts  the
Italian state’s position firmly on one side this debate: it identifies a clear set of criteria
by which “fascist” behaviour may be known, and the criteria in question involve a
certain  set  of  attitudes  and  behaviours  in  relation  to  “the  dissolved  Italian  Fascist
Party”. It takes, in other words, an indexical attitude to the term—linking it closely to a
particular object in the world—and firmly attaches it to the historical period in which
an actual fascist regime existed, rendering more or less legally moot the question of
whether  fascism may or  may not  exist  in  some form or  another  today.  More than
merely  a  practice  of  censorship,  in  other  words,  it  is  a  passive  intervention  into
historiographical,  legal,  and  popular  debates,  one  which  constitutes  “fascism” as  a
precisely  delineated  object  in  the  world,  whose  contours  accord  roughly  with  the
twenty or so years in which Mussolini governed Italy known as the “ventennio”.
10 Below I outline examples of this position as they emerge in everyday life in Predappio
in  order  to  demonstrate  that  the  practice  of  abstaining  from  censorship  there  is
underwritten by the same logic. Such productive abstention has effects, of course, the
most  obvious  of  which  is  to  bolster  claims  that  it  makes  no  sense  to  speak  of  a
contemporary resurgence of fascism.
11 Much contemporary work on censorship (such as what is  sometimes referred to as
“New Censorship Theory”—see, e.g., Bunn 2015) highlights the productive—rather than
repressive—aspects of censorship practices. Censorship, so such arguments go, is not
solely or even largely about stopping people from thinking or saying certain things, it
is  about  inciting or  obliging them to think or  speak in particular  ways about  such
things.  In  a  recent  review of  debates  on the  subject  amongst  historians  and social
scientists, Matthew Bunn argues that the most basic challenge of this body of work to
so-called “liberal” conceptions of  censorship is  whether “the absence of  censorship
constitutes any meaningful  sense of  ‘free speech’” (Bunn 2015:  40).  If  “censorship”,
understood in a very broad sense, pervades “discourse”, then forms of state control
over  speech  or  publications  are  only  particularly  obvious  and  heavy-handed
manifestations of a ubiquitous phenomenon.
12 Rather than a productive practice of censorship, this article will examine a context in
which what is productive—in the sense of constituting an intervention in a wider set of
debates—is precisely the absence of censorship where one might expect to find it. If
censorship is,  in effect,  everywhere,  it  will  ask,  what does it  mean to abstain from
censoring something?
13 Based  on  eight  months  of  fieldwork  in  the  Italian  village  of  Predappio,  as  well  as
historical material regarding post-war Italian jurisprudence, I argue that an absence of
censorship may still constitute a form of productive intervention. In the case I describe,
this absence puts the position of the law on one side of an ongoing debate regarding the
nature and definition of fascism.
 
“The grave of myth”
14 “History is the crucial weapon in this fight,” the Mayor was saying. “History is the way
in which we combat ignorance, history is the way young people will learn about the
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mistakes of the past. We [Predappio] have been the Chernobyl of history of for too long,
and now we need to confront our past.”
15 We were standing in the main square of Predappio, outside the ruins of the former
Fascist Party headquarters, and its then-Mayor was holding forth to a Danish television
news  crew.  Having  at  this  point  been  conducting  fieldwork  in  Predappio  and  its
environs since spring 2016, I had heard him give variations on this speech a number of
times, to local, national, and international audiences. “History” is a word he is very
fond of,  though he is  a  geology teacher  by profession,  and I  have rarely  seen him
prouder than when he discovered that a quotation consisting of a variation of these
remarks makes up the final lines of a recent book by an eminent German historian of
fascism (Woller 2015). Though his political opponents take issue with some of the tacit
implications of his focus on history, as I describe below, he is undoubtedly correct that
it is impossible to understand Predappio without understanding some of its history.
The question of how far it remains history, and how far it reverberates in the present
day, is much more complicated, however. The arguments I  describe below, in other
words, are partly about historical memory, and about what form Italy’s relationship to
its fascist past should take. But they are also about whether or not fascism is, in fact,
history in the first place, or whether it continues to live on in some form or another. In
that  sense  these  debates  mirror  that  more  international  preoccupation  with  a
potentially resurgent fascism, and how exactly one ought to recognize such a thing.
This is the logic behind, for example, The Atlantic’s interview of historian Robert Paxton
in  search  of  a  definition  of  “fascism”,3 and  that  word’s  candidacy  for  Merriam-
Webster’s “Word of the Year” prize in 2016. In this section I describe some examples of
arguments based on the notion that fascism is largely or only a matter of history, and
that  therefore  those  who  come to  Predappio  to  celebrate  it  may  be  thought  of  as
strange or even ridiculous, but not as dangerous.
16 The original Predappio (now known as Predappio Alta) is a tiny medieval village that
sits at the top of a hill, complete with its own small castle (Rocca) and a cobbled square
with three churches on it. About four kilometres farther down this hill lies a settlement
—originally  nothing more than a  handful  of  houses  and an osteria—that  used to  be
known as Dovia, named after the two roads (due vie) that intersect it, one that heads
over the mountains to Tuscany and one that continues up the hill to Predappio Alta.
17 Benito  Mussolini  was  born in  Dovia  in  1883,  the son of  a  blacksmith and the local
schoolteacher. Shortly after he gained power in Italy in 1922 he paid a much-publicized
visit to the village, and immediately after this visit a deputation of local dignitaries
went to see him in Rome to propose a plan of urban renewal for the area. Building work
commenced in the mid-1920s and went on until the late 1930s. Dovia—or Predappio
Nuova, as it became known, and eventually simply Predappio—was transformed from a
backwater hamlet into a monument to Fascist urban planning and the humble origins
of  its  Duce.  It  became a  highly  self-conscious  feature  of  the  regime’s  myth-making
apparatus, and the regime paid for and organized tour group travel to the village for
ordinary  Italians  (Serenelli  2013).  Mussolini  himself  made  frequent  visits,  often
accompanied by visiting foreign dignitaries.
18 As Sergio  Luzzato  (2011)  recounts  in  detail,  in  1957—twelve  years  after  Mussolini’s
execution at the hands of partisans—Adone Zoli of the dominant centre-right Christian
Democrats became Italy’s Prime Minister. He led a minority government which, for the
first time, was obliged to rely on a “confidence and supply” agreement with the post-
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war incarnation of Italy’s Fascist Party, then called the Italian Social Movement (MSI).
Zoli  also happened to be another native of Predappio, a member of the family that
owned the land on which Mussolini’s wife had been born. One aspect of the agreement
he reached with the MSI was that Mussolini’s body—at the time hidden in a Capuchin
convent—would  be  returned  to  his  family  and  interred  in  their  crypt,  located  in
Predappio’s  local  cemetery.  Zoli  is  alleged  to  have  telephoned  the  then  Mayor  of
Predappio to ask for his blessing, and the response he received is regularly quoted by
contemporary Predappiesi: “Mussolini didn’t scare us when he was alive, and he won’t
scare us now that he’s dead.” The body was reburied in the cemetery of San Cassiano on
31 August 1957, and accompanying it were around three thousand five hundred neo-
fascists. Seven thousand more turned up the following weekend to pay their respects.
Since  then  the  village  has  received  around  eighty  to  one  hundred  thousand  such
“black” tourists per year. Mussolini may or may not scare Predappiesi since his death,
but the presence of his body has certainly had a significant impact on their lives.
19 It is impossible to escape the subject of fascism in contemporary Predappio. The main
street, once known as Corso Benito Mussolini, is now named after the regime’s most
famous victim, Giacomo Matteoti. Walking up it, one encounters three shops which sell
what are euphemistically referred to as “souvenirs” or “gadgets”: t-shirts and babies’
bibs with fascist slogans or images of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin printed on
them, marble and bronze busts of Mussolini, war memorabilia, copies of Mein Kampf,
and even manganelli, the clubs with which fascist squads would beat their opponents.
Architecturally,  the village is  entirely dominated by the style of  the ventennio since
most of it was built in that period by architects such as Florestano di Fausto. The first
square on Corso Matteoti was built to frame the house in which Mussolini was born,
which the regime exhibited as a sort of shrine, and which is now an exhibition space.
The next and largest square is overlooked by the imposing Church of St Anthony, on
whose façade is inscribed its date of completion in the “E. F”, or “Era Fascista”. Next to
the church, the old village hospital still has a fasces embedded in one of two decorative
orifices.  Across  the  square  is  the  former  Casa  del  Fascio  e  dell’ospitalita,  the  large
former PNF headquarters that was once used to house visiting dignitaries and to host
public events (Storchi 2019). Now desolate and in ruins, pigeons roost in its eaves.
20 A little  farther  up  the  street  one  comes  to  the  cemetery  of  San  Cassiano,  another
product of the ventennio, and the site of the Mussolini family crypt. The crypt is the first
thing that one sees upon entering the cemetery, at the end of the path which begins at
the cemetery gates. Descending down a flight of stone steps, one emerges in a small
subterranean chamber in which the remains of Mussolini’s wife, children, and some
affines are entombed in stone sarcophagi,  sometimes topped with photographs and
often with flowers. The crypt is dominated by a large bust of Mussolini himself, who
gazes out over his own sarcophagus and a visitors’ book in which are inscribed, by my
average count, around thirty to forty new messages a day, most of which are variations
on a theme of “Come back to us, Duce!” (see also Zoli & Moressa 2007). Ascending out of
the crypt via a second staircase, one is faced with several walls covered almost entirely
in  plaques  donated  by  formal  or  informal  neo-fascist  groups,  commemorating  a
particular visit to the tomb or the passing of a comrade.
21 The status of fascism, or neo-fascism, in Predappio has often reflected broader aspects
of the Italian social and political context. For instance, in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
during a period of  significant political  tension in Italy characterized by heightened
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ideological  divisions  between left  and right,  as  well  as  acts  of  terrorism,  including
kidnappings,  assassinations,  and  mass  murder,  there  were  serious  clashes  between
visiting  far-right  pilgrims  and  left-wing  students  and  activists  from  extra-
parliamentary  groups  such  as  Lotta  Continua.4 These  tensions  culminated  in  the
explosion of a bomb at the Mussolini family crypt in 1971. With the arrival of the 1980s
and 1990s, and the collapse of both the Christian Democrat and Communist parties in
the  wake  of  corruption  scandals,  “black”  tourism  in  Predappio  began  to  become
commercialized: 1983 saw the first sales of Mussolini-themed wine on the centenary of
his birth, and the 1990s saw the opening of the first of the so-called “souvenir shops”.
The 1990s also saw a shift  in Italian far-right politics  more broadly,  witnessing the
transformation  of  the  once  radical  MSI—the  successor  to  the  PNF—into  the  more
mainstream and politically palatable National Alliance, which would go on to form a
government  with  Silvio  Berlusconi,  and  distance  itself  from  Predappio  and  fascist
nostalgia more generally.
22 Today the three major days of pilgrimage each bring around three thousand visitors to
Predappio on the morning of the first Sunday following the anniversary in question.
From around eight o’clock onwards groups of black-shirted men (and some women and
children)  start  to  gather  around  the  four  bars  on  Predappio’s  main  street,  before
coalescing into a discernible mass on the square in front of the church at around ten.
Flags bearing the Italian tricolore and the Celtic cross are on display, as are banners
decorated with slogans like “Honour to the Fatherland” and “Will you arrest all of us?”
The  procession  is  mustered  by  officiants  from  Forza  Nuova  wearing  tricolour
armbands, and at the front is often a group carrying wreaths to lay at Mussolini’s tomb.
Many participants wear replica uniforms, or fez hats, a staple of fascist uniforms since
the end of the First World War. They march the one and a half kilometres from the
square to the cemetery of San Cassiano where they gather outside the gates for brief
speeches (attended by Roman salutes), before queuing to enter the crypt and pay their
respects or lay a flower on the tomb.
23 Current  attitudes  towards  the  pilgrimages,  the  souvenir  shops,  and  the  tomb  in
Predappio are wide-ranging and varied, and certainly complex enough to merit more
attention than they can be given in the present discussion. In the past, I have often
been told, locals would avoid going out on the pilgrimage days in case of violence, but
today they are much more likely to regard the parades as a minor inconvenience to
traffic.  Some object  on principle,  and I  know business  owners  who will  close  their
premises  on  the  basis  that  they  cannot  trust  themselves  willingly  to  serve  such
customers. One such businessman recounted to me with mischievous delight the fight
he very nearly had with a man he described as “a dwarf wearing a balilla [fascist youth]
uniform”. But the most common response returns us to the question of history with
which I  opened this  section,  for it  consists  in regarding them as part  of  a  possibly
distasteful but more or less harmless from of nostalgia. “Nostalgics” (“nostalgici”) is in
fact by far and away the most common noun used to refer to these visitors, rather than
any political designation, and the marches are often described as “folkloric”, in the
sense of involving a slightly strange or superficial veneration of tradition. People tend
to  shrug  and  smile  wryly  at  the  sight  of  ancient-looking  men  with  extravagant
moustaches wearing the uniform of the fascist youth organization, as English people
might do at a troupe of Morris dancers or street artists in Shakespearean clothing. “It’s
like a carnival,” as a local artist put it. “Instead of being in the Carnival of Viareggio,
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we’re in Mussolini’s carnival. Let them be and they’ll just go home. They’re ridiculous:
forty-year old kids dressed up as senior Fascist officers.”
24 To this way of thinking it is simply perverse, rather than menacing, to dress up and
march around chanting  slogans  from a  bygone era,  and the  fact  that  many of  the
people doing so are too young to actually remember the ventennio  is  often cited as
evidence for the fact that what they are doing cannot relate to “real” historical fascism.
There has long been local talk of the numbers of visitors diminishing as the ventennio
recedes  further  and  further  away  into  history  and  fewer  and  fewer  of  those  who
remember  it  remain  alive.  The  commercialization  of  the  visits  and  marches  has
contributed to the sense of  their  banality (what could possibly be “fascist” about a
bottle of wine with Mussolini’s face printed on it, some say) and people joke about the
lack of ideological conviction of those who run the souvenir shops. One friend would
insist to me with a grin when the subject came up that one particular proprietor would
be  quite  happy  to  sell  Che  Guevara  t-shirts  if  only  Predappio  had  been  fortunate
enough  to  have  him,  instead  of  Mussolini,  as  its  most  famous  product.  Many
Predappiesi, in other words, share their former Mayor’s belief that fascism is primarily
a historical object, regardless of how they evaluate it. Indeed, it is worth pointing out
that Predappio has been governed by a constant succession of communist and left-wing
mayors ever since the war, and that it lies in the heart of a region with a powerful
socialist heritage. The notion that “fascism” is solely or largely a matter of history, in
other words, is not exclusive to those on the right of the political spectrum.
25 To say that Predappio’s fascist heritage is a matter of history is not, however, to say
that it is undeserving of interest: the village has recently returned to the front pages of
the national  and international  press  as  a  new set  of  political  debates has emerged.
These debates centre on contemporary Italy’s relationship to its fascist past, and in that
respect are by no means entirely new (see, e.g., Bosworth 1998). A sense of urgency has
been added to them, however, thanks to much more widespread international concerns
over a rising and resurgent far-right. In Italy, although the radical right, in the form of
parties  such  as  Forza  Nuova  and CasaPound,5 performed  rather  badly  in  the  most
recent general election, such concerns are often focused on Interior Minister Matteo
Salvini’s anti-immigrant Lega, which won nearly 18% of the vote. Salvini himself seems
to enjoy stoking such concerns by, for instance, tweeting quotes from Mussolini.
26 Predappio appears in these debates not simply because it has long been a symbol of the
undigested  nature  of  Italy’s  fascist  past,  but  also  because  of  its  potential  future:  a
“Documentation Centre” on fascism is to be installed in the now derelict former Casa
del Fascio in the town square, which would be the first of its kind in Italy. It is this
project that the Mayor had in mind when he spoke of the need to confront the past.
The project, however, has engendered a great deal of controversy, partly in regard to
the choice of Predappio as a location. A number of commentators have made the point
that installing what many refer to as a “museum” of fascism in a place dominated by
the contemporary far-right risks undermining its purpose: how, they ask, will visiting
schoolchildren  react  to  finding  shops  selling  fascist  “souvenirs”  next  door  to  the
documentation centre?6 Some go so far as to call Predappio a “toxic waste dump” of
history,  seeing  its  heritage  as  effectively  irredeemable.7 Other  objections  raised  in
relation to the project centre more on content, however, and return us to the problem
of the nature of fascism as an object. For instance, the centre’s permanent exhibition is
currently  projected  to  conclude  its  narrative  in  1945.  One  of  the  members  of  its
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scientific committee explained this decision to me on the basis that fascism and neo-
fascism are “completely different”: “first of all because it’s [neofascism] an element in a
democratic country, not a regime … [and] they call themselves neo-fascists, neo-nazis …
but I don’t think they really understand the regime they’re harking back to”. Others
involved in the project explained the difference in terms of content of policy, or of
symbolism, but in each case there was a shared understanding that “fascism”, properly
speaking, refers only to a historical object, not to any contemporary phenomena. As
with  local  interpretations  of  the  pilgrimages  as  a  matter  of  nostalgia  and folklore,
“fascism”  is  understood  here  as  a  purely  historical  object,  disconnected  from  any
contemporary  phenomena  which  might  resemble  it.  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  some
critics of the project, on the other hand, have told me they think it would be absurd,
not to mention compromising, for the centre to have nothing to say on the subject of
the men and women who will presumably continue to march up and down outside of it
wearing fascist uniforms and regalia.
27 These popular debates regarding the pilgrimages and the documentation centre project
are examples of the same set of arguments regarding how to identify “fascism” that I
have already introduced. But the logic that unites both defences of the documentation
centre and the attitude that neo-fascist pilgrimages are merely an instance of nostalgia
have a long historical  pedigree.  As far  back as 1944,  for instance,  Benedetto Croce,
Italian philosopher and leading figure in the Liberal Party, wrote a series of articles—
including one tellingly titled “Who is a fascist?”—in which he argued that fascism was a
form of civic depression, a moral disease that might affect anyone of any class, status,
or nationality.8 Also, crucially, it was thus a phenomenon unrelated to any systemic
issues in Italian social or cultural life, and could hence be dismissed as a “parenthesis”
in the history of an otherwise great nation (an idea to be found in discussions of other
fascist regimes such as Vichy France—see, e.g., Paxton 1972). Historian R. J. B. Bosworth
notes that Croce’s interpretation cleared a path for the historiographical debates which
followed the publication of Renzo De Felice’s Intervista sul fascismo in 1975 (De Felice
1985).  De  Felice,  Italy’s  most  prominent  historian of  fascism,  the author  of  a  four-
volume biography of Mussolini, caused significant controversy by criticizing what he
called an anti-fascist “vulgate” dominated by journalists and amateurs interested only
in making moral judgements on fascism, rather than the scientific ones with which he
himself claimed only to be concerned. In tandem with such arguments came the related
notion that one needed a degree of distance and detachment to properly understand
fascism, the sort that ought to be afforded by the fact that it was a purely historical
phenomenon, one which should be thought of as “rigidly limited” in time to the period
of the ventennio.
 
The dead hand of the censor
28 From a legal perspective, the problem of exactly how “dead” fascism is has also been an
issue since at least the fall of the regime. It was not only Croce who was worrying over
who  was  fascist  in  1944,  it  was  the  occupying  Allied  powers  and  the  new  Italian
government as well, which had taken on the status of “co-belligerents” with the Allies.
Article 30 of the Long Armistice between Italy and the Allies, signed on 29 September
1943,  obliged  the  Italian  government  to  “carry  out  all  directives  which  the  United
Nations may call for, including the abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and
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internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist
ideologies and teachings” (Domenico 1991: 22). All of this was, of course, much easier
said than done given that over twenty years had passed since the regime first took
power and by 1943 it  was hard to tell  the difference between “Fascist” and simply
“Italian” institutions,  funds,  and personnel.  Indeed,  many of  the new regime’s  pro-
Allied leaders had at some point or another held prominent positions under Mussolini.
But  this  was precisely the difference that  interested the Allies  and the post-Fascist
Italian government (and Croce, hence his characterization of fascism as distinct from
particularly Italian social or cultural issues). Italy’s new Prime Minister, Marshal Pietro
Badoglio, himself a former Chief of the Italian General Staff at the outset of the war,
issued a circular on 4 November 1943 declaring that “the Fascist regime … is decidedly
dead in  the minds of  Italians”,  thus  establishing 1943 as  the cut-off  point  between
fascism and what came after (Domenico 1991: 20).
29 A different distinction, however, was later drawn as a result of the broader political and
military situation in Italy: in 1944 a questionnaire (“scheda personale”) was issued to all
Italian state employees by the Allied Military Government listing forty-three categories
of  questions  regarding  their  involvement  with  the  Fascist  regime.  Though  the
questionnaire covered a range of possible answers (including whether or not one had
once been Secretary-General of the PNF), the crucial section was categories 32 to 38
(Domenico 1991: 34),  which dealt with the Italian Social Republic (RSI),  the German
puppet regime established in 1943 in the north of Italy, of which Mussolini was titular
head, and with which, of course, both the Allies and the new Italian government were
at  war.  So,  for  practical  reasons—the  difficulty  involved  in  distinguishing  between
erstwhile fascists and new-found “co-belligerents”, and the need to combat the RSI—
the broad project of de-fascistization envisioned in the Long Armistice became a much
narrower one of rooting out those guilty of simple treason to the new government by
their continued adherence to the RSI. In other words, solving the problem of how to
censor  or  proscribe  “fascism”  by  distinguishing  between  different  historical
“fascisms”—whether “fascism” of the ventennio and “neo-fascism”, or “fascism” of the
ventennio and “fascism” of the RSI—has a long and established history.
30 The 1952 Legge Scelba, as I noted earlier, is based on the 12th Disposition of the 1947
Italian constitution, which forbids the reorganization of “the dissolved Italian Fascist
Party”.  The  Scelba  Law  also  prohibits  “apologias”  for  it,  as  well  as  public
demonstrations in favour of it. But over the years, several Italian courts have issued a
number of decisions which very much restrict—or simply confuse—the scope of the
application of the Scelba Law and its constitutional antecedent. For instance, one year
after the return of Mussolini’s body to Predappio, in 1958, three men—two of whom had
been indicted for wearing a black shirt and performing the Roman salute at the Duce’s
tomb—were acquitted of the crime of “apologia” by Italy’s constitutional court, which
ruled that the law could only apply in situations in which there was a realistic and
intended prospect of actually reconstituting the PNF (Sentenza no. 74, 1958). In 1994
the  Council  of  State  declared  that  use  of  the  fasces  as  a  political  symbol  did  not
constitute  a  breach of  electoral  law because  of  its  longer  association with  classical
Rome.9 More recently, in 2014 the criminal section of the Court of Cassation condemned
two CasaPound militants for giving the Roman salute at a march, declaring that the risk
of the reappearance of a “concrete” Fascist Party had not dissipated over the years, and
that  “symbolic  gestures”  such  as  the  Roman  salute  constitute  “publicity”  by  their
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nature,  and thus “are endowed with objective danger for the values of democracy”
(Sentenza no.  37577,  2014).  However,  four years later,  the same court absolved two
other CasaPound militants for the same crime, divorcing what it had previously put
together: it declared that the Scelba Law criminalized only a “concrete danger”, not
thought or manifestations of thought. Only symbols and language liable to lead directly
to the reconstitution of the Fascist Party could be considered a crime (Sentenza no.
8108, 2018).
31 More striking even than the confusion of the law’s application, however, is its explicit
formulation and the manner in which it has been interpreted. The word “dissolved” (“
disciolto”)  was deliberately added to the words “Italian Fascist  Party” by the Italian
Constituent Assembly in 1947 specifically to make clear the fact that the law had a
concrete historical referent.10 Palmiro Togliatti, then leader of the Italian Communist
Party,  answered a  question during this  debate  on the  difficulty  of  defining what  a
“fascist party” is by saying that clearly definition was “historically determined”11. The
Scelba Law can be and has been read, in other words, as censoring and prohibiting not a
fascist party, but specifically the Fascist Party, rendering it more or less inapplicable to
many of the contemporary phenomena one might imagine could be described by the
word.
32 This is in striking contrast to Germany, for instance, where anti-fascist protestors have
sometimes  been  prosecuted  for  displaying  crossed-out  swastikas  on  the  basis  that
Section 86a of  the Federal  Criminal  Code prohibits  the display of  “unconstitutional
symbols”,  such as  those  associated with  the  Nazi  Party.  Nitzan Shoshan (2016)  has
recently pointed to the complexity inherent in German legal understandings of how
far-right  symbols  work.  Relations  between  signs  and  banned  organizations  may  be
purely  symbolic—that  is,  arbitrary—and  of  varying  strength,  but  they  may  also  be
iconic and/or indexical, in that they may replicate in form the object they symbolizes—
so neo-nazi violence looks like national socialist violence—and/or point to and do the
work of that object itself—so a swastika does not just “stand for” Nazism, it in some
sense  makes  Nazism  present  in  its  appearance  (2016:  106).  All  of  these  different
understandings come together to inform judicial rulings on the use of such symbols,
alongside  readings  of  intention  and  effect  (2016:  107),  rulings  which  can  be  as
contradictory and inconsistent as in the Italian case. In contrast to Italian court rulings
on  the  Scelba  Law,  however,  German  constitutional  jurisprudence  criminalizes
Holocaust  denial—an  expression  of  thought—regardless  of  whether  or  not  it  is
accompanied by normative calls for action, though it does distinguish between the two
(Stradella 2008: 70). Unlike in the Italian case, there is no requirement for prosecutors
to demonstrate immediate danger to democracy or of the reconstitution of the Nazi
Party. The expression is an offence in and of itself (Article 19 2018: 23).
33 Though the strength of the symbolic relation between “fascist” signs and “fascism” is
sometimes at issue in the Italian context—for instance in the ruling noted earlier on the
use of the fasces as a political symbol, in which the question was whether as a sign the
fasces have any more to do with the PNF than they have to do with classical Rome—the
issue of the application of the Scelba Law seems to revolve solely around the question
of indexicality: to constitute a case of “apologia”, the law requires that the behaviour,
speech, or symbols in question unambiguously conjure up—and defend—the object in
the world that was “the dissolved Italian Fascist Party”. This understanding is implicit
in the notion that the law refers not to a generic “fascism” but specifically to the Italian
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Fascist Party, and so for a crime to be committed it must be that specific object in the
world that is made present. It is also explicit in the interpretation of the law that claims
that for a crime to be committed there must be a realistic prospect of the PNF actually
being reconstituted.
34 An obvious defence of this line of legal reasoning is that broader rights to free speech
and freedom of ideas are easier to defend from forms of censorship that target highly
specific objects: the less indexical the legal language in question, the easier it is for
censors to sweep all and sundry into its purview (as in the odd cases of German anti-
fascists  being  prosecuted  for  displaying  crossed-out  swastikas).  Whilst  this  is
undoubtedly true, the Italian case demonstrates that such targeted forms of censorship
are  by  no  means  necessarily  neutral  in  their  effect  on  wider  patterns  of  speech,
discourse, and ideas. The refusal to censor the woman in the “Auschwitzland” shirt and
others like her is not merely a negative claim (“this is not fascism”) but also a positive
one about what fascism “really” is, namely a very specific kind of historical object, in
line with that broader set of perspectives on fascism which stretch back from at least
Croce onwards.
 
What censorship does when it does nothing
35 To  constitute  a  legitimate  object  of  the  censor  in  Italy,  a  sign—a  Roman  salute,  a
uniform, or a shirt with a slogan printed on it—must conjure up and defend in manner
likely to bring about its rebirth not a set of ideas or beliefs, but the very definite object
in the world that was “the dissolved Italian Fascist Party”. As such, this legal regime is
also an intervention into an older and much wider set of debates over exactly what
“fascism” was or is: if “fascism” is a purely historical object, then the use of the word to
describe  contemporary  versions  of  far-right  politics  may  be  cast  as  misguided
scaremongering.
36 So, in this instance the productive intervention of censorship comes in the form of
passivity  and abstinence,  rather  than action.  Unlike,  for  instance,  the  East  German
censors described by Dominic Boyer (2003) as possessing an intellectual vocation and as
practising censorship as a form of craftsmanship, the “productivity” of the censorious
intervention I have described here depends on the censor’s (legally justifiable) inaction.
So the issue here is not, in fact, censorship, but its absence.
37 That such absence is a judicial choice rather than a necessity is also testified to by the
law itself. I have hitherto emphasized its indexical qualities because such has been the
emphasis  placed  by  Italian  courts,  but  the  text  of  the  law  itself  offers  alternative
interpretations.  For  instance,  the  12th Disposition of  the  constitution prohibits  the
reorganization of the “dissolved” Fascist Party “in any form”, thus leaving open a much
broader reading of what might constitute such reorganization than the “historically
determined” reading largely favoured in the courts. Moreover, the Scelba Law itself
lists a range of features which may be taken as signs of such reorganization: threats or
use of violence as a political instrument; arguing for the suppression of constitutional
liberties; denigrating the values of democracy or the resistance; or simply “external
manifestations of a fascist character”. Yet from almost the moment in which it was
enshrined  in  law  (see,  e.g.,  Sentenza  no.  74,  1958)  it  has  been  read  as  demanding
indexicality:  alone,  signs  themselves  do  not  render  fascism  present.  They  must  be
coupled with a demonstrable intention to do so and a likelihood of success.
Fascism, uncensored
Terrain | 2019
11
38 William Mazzarella has recently argued that censorship may be conceived of as a form
of  sovereign  “dispensation”  (2013:  41–42),  an  exception  justified  by  special
circumstances, but increasingly a permanent state of affairs (2013: 28). In the case of
Indian cinema with which he is concerned, pro-censorship reasoning conceives modern
India as in transition, between colonial tutelage and the maturity of a fully democratic
mass  media  society.  Before  the  advent  of  the  latter,  censorship  is  a  necessary  if
regrettable evil.
39 In the case I have described here the same concerns about the past and its relationship
to the future are at work. Are “external manifestations of a fascist character” oriented
only  backwards—and  thus  merely  “commemorative”,  as  the  most  recent  court
judgment on the subject put it (Sentenza no. 8108, 2018), and “nostalgic”— or are they
oriented towards the future? Is the future they promote a reversion to Italy’s fascist
past, or something entirely new? Has the “risk” posed by fascism diminished over the
years since its fall or does it still constitute an “objective danger” (Sentenza no. 37577,
2014)? Such questions hover in the background of a number of contemporary debates
about the proper meaning and definition of “fascism”, and are activated as much by the
suspension of censorship as by its application.
40 Instances of the withdrawal and suspension of censorship raise questions as to what
censorship does when it pointedly does nothing, as it were; these questions resemble
those raised by Boyer regarding the cultural logics of censorship as a lived practice, but
they  widen their  scope  to  include  instances  in  which  the  practice  in  question  is
abstinence. Attention to instances of the withdrawal or suspension of censorship has
implications for fundamental debates about the nature of censorship (e.g. Butler 1998);
for even if the absence of sovereign forms of censorship does not constitute a domain
of  “free  speech”,  it  may  nevertheless  constitute  something  else.  In  the  case  of
Predappio and Italy more broadly it makes a meaningful difference to public discourse
on fascism when the courts rule that something is not, in fact, “fascist”, and therefore
undeserving of censorship. So however we define censorship, it is important to retain a
language with which to speak about situations in which it is—or certain forms of it are,
at least—held in abeyance.
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ABSTRACTS
This article describes the afterlife of the 1952 Scelba Law in Italy, which forbids “apologias” for
the fascist regime, and its chequered history of application. Intended to censor, amongst other
things, speech directed towards the reconstitution of an Italian fascist party, fascist propaganda,
and fascist demonstrations, the Scelba Law has been sparingly and inconsistently applied. This is
particularly  evident  in  the  village  of  Predappio,  Mussolini’s  home  town,  and  one  of  Italy’s
premier sites of neo-fascist tourism. This article explores the ways in which the pointed absence
of censorship in Predappio constitutes an intervention in a wider set of debates surrounding how
to  identify  “fascism”  as  an  object.  It  thus  highlights  the  value  of  examining  not  only  the
Fascism, uncensored
Terrain | 2019
14
productivity of censorship as a practice and vocation but also the potentially productive force of
abstaining from censorship.
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